Faculty Sabbatical, University of Mary Washington

Summer Stipend, National Endowment for the Humanities

Verville Fellowship, National Air and Space Museum, Washington, DC

Waple Professorship, University of Mary Washington

Faculty Development Grant, University of Mary Washington

Bernadotte Schmitt Grant, American Historical Association

Research Scholar, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC

Social Sciences Research Council Dissertation Write-up Fellowship

Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship`

Aeroflot Routes to Baghdad: Soviet-Iraqi Relations during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1981)

The World’s Largest Airline: How Aeroflot Learned to Stop Worrying and Became a Corporation

Second World Urbanity: Infrastructures of Utopia and Really Existing Socialism

Soviet Mass Housing and the Communist Way of Life

"We Too Want To Live in Normal Apartments": Soviet Mass Housing and the Marginalization of the Elderly Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev

Everyday Life in the NEP, the Thaw, and the Communal Apartment

Dawn of the Soviet Jet Age: Aeroflot Passengers and Aviation Culture under Khrushchev

The Russian Aviation Industry Two Years after the Sanctions

This fascinating and deeply researched book examines how, beginning under Khrushchev in 1953, a generation of Soviet citizens moved from the overcrowded communal dwellings of the Stalin era to modern single-family apartments, later dubbed khrushchevka. Arguing that moving to a separate apartment allowed ordinary urban dwellers to experience Khrushchev’s thaw, Steven E. Harris fundamentally shifts interpretation of the thaw, conventionally understood as an elite phenomenon. Harris focuses on the many participants eager to benefit from and influence the new way of life embodied by the khrushchevka, its furniture, and its associated consumer goods. He examines activities of national and local politicians, planners, enterprise managers, workers, furniture designers and architects, elite organizations (centrally involved in creating cooperative housing), and ordinary urban dwellers. Communism on Tomorrow Street also demonstrates the relationship of Soviet mass housing and urban planning to international efforts at resolving the "housing question" that had been studied since the nineteenth century and led to housing developments in Western Europe, the United States, and Latin America as well as the USSR.

Communism on Tomorrow Street: Mass Housing and Everyday Life after Stalin

Welcome to the University of Mary Washington, a public arts and sciences institution in Fredericksburg, Va., that attracts intellectually curious undergraduate and graduate students in search of rigorous academics. The university – located midway between Richmond, Va., and Washington, D.C. – provides a rich array of academic, research, internship, leadership, and recreational opportunities that not only train students for the real world but allow them to interact closely with faculty members.

University of Mary Washington

As Russia’s resurgent global influence grows—from social media influencing to anti-Western alliances—Steven E. Harris’s expertise in modern Russian and European history has become increasingly sought-after. Harris provides expert analysis on Russia’s political economy during its war of aggression against Ukraine and how the country seeks to reshape geopolitics and achieve expansionist goals. Focusing on Russian aviation, Harris explains how Putin’s regime has adapted to Western sanctions and how Russia’s airlines and aerospace industry are evolving in an era of global economic nationalism.

In addition to teaching courses in UMW’s Department of History and American Studies, Harris is currently writing a book entitled Autocratic Airways: Aeroflot and the Russian Jet Age from Stalin to Putin. Based on extensive archival research in Russia, Ukraine, and the U.S., his book project explores the history of the “world’s largest airline” and how the USSR and now Putin’s Russia have used commercial aviation to forge a unique, illiberal version of the Jet Age. Harris received a Verville Fellowship from the National Air and Space Museum and a Waple Professorship from UMW to advance work on this book, as well as a Summer Stipend from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

Harris is also the author of Communism on Tomorrow Street: Mass Housing and Everyday Life after Stalin (Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), which examines how Soviet citizens’ move from overcrowded communal housing to single-family apartments fundamentally transformed the post-Stalinist “thaw” from an elite to a mass phenomenon. A list of Harris’s scholarly publications and analyses of contemporary Russian aviation is available on his UMW faculty page.

Russian History

Contemporary Russia

Commercial Aviation

Global Socialism

Aerospace History

History Department Profile

UMW Profile

Putin beslagla 400 vestlige fly

Sanctions Are Spoiling Russia’s Plans to Make Its Own Airplanes

West Sanctions Russian Aviation, But Moscow Decides to Keep Planes Flying Despite Risks.

Au bon vieux temps des vols low cost soviétiques

Soviet housing was famously drab. This Ukraine complex is all about color

Wings of the Motherland: Soviet Aviation and Putin’s Russia with Steve Harris

with-russias-war-in-ukraine-aeroflot-faces-unfriendly-skies

UMW's expert on Russia has expert insight on key industries as the war rages against Ukraine

Professor

 As Russia’s resurgent global influence grows—from social media influencing to anti-Western alliances—Steven E. Harris’s expertise in modern Russian and European history has become increasingly sought-after. Harris provides expert analysis on Russia’s political economy during its war of aggression against Ukraine and how the country seeks to reshape geopolitics and achieve expansionist goals. Focusing on Russian aviation, Harris explains how Putin’s regime has adapted to Western sanctions and how Russia’s airlines and aerospace industry are evolving in an era of global economic nationalism.

Below are two important pieces authored by Harris that were posted by the Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia at NYU.

This blog post reflects on the historical significance of the sudden rupture in global aviation that took place after Russia invaded Ukraine, focusing on Russia and the US in particular....   Yesterday's post addressed the new cold war in the skies, which has divided the West from Russia as a consequence of Russia's aggression in Ukraine. Sanctions against Russia’s aviation sector...   As the war between Russia and Ukraine stretches toward its third year - there are more and more angles and narratives to cover.

And if you're a journalist looking to know more or have questions for a story - experts like Steven. E. Harris are here to help.

He's available to speak with reporters - simply click on his icon now to arrange an interview today.



With Russia’s War in Ukraine, Aeroflot Faces Unfriendly Skies

covering-russia-umws-experts-are-featured-in-the-harvard-kennedy-school-belfer-center-for-science-and-international-affairs

Steven E. Harris contributed this piece to Russia matters last fall

West Sanctions Russian Aviation, But Moscow Decides to Keep Planes Flying Despite Risks  When the U.S. and its allies slapped sanctions on Russia for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, severing aviation links was at the top of the list. Direct flights vanished and Russian airlines lost access to spare parts for their foreign airplanes. In retaliation, Vladimir Putin’s regime impounded foreign aircraft and shut off the world’s largest air space to countries imposing sanctions. Not since the early 1980s—when the U.S. suspended routes to the USSR over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, repression in Poland and downing of a Korean Air Lines plane—have aviation ties between the two countries dipped so low. Aviation sanctions today are having an impact but come with a major risk. If the fatal crash of a jetliner killing hundreds is linked to the lack of spare parts, Putin will blame sanctions and the West. The stakes are high as Russia seeks to use any issue from cluster bombs to soccer to widen cracks in Western unity over Ukraine. To get ahead of this, U.S. policymakers and their allies need to better explain the effects of sanctions, why they’re worth the risk and why the Russian state, not the West, is ultimately responsible for any fatal crash.

U.S. government assessments place Russian aviation among sectors negatively impacted by sanctions. A closer look shows widening success in degrading this increasingly weak link in Russia’s political economy. By late 2021, foreign aircraft comprised 70% of Russia’s fleet of 801 passenger airplanes, which included 298 Airbuses, 236 Boeings, and 23 other foreign aircraft such as Embraers. In addition, 95% of Russian airline flights were on foreign-made aircraft.  Consequently, sanctions aimed at depriving spare parts for foreign airplanes have caused many disruptions such as fare increases to cover higher costs of repairs. Some of Russia’s 53 airlines have periodically suspended or stopped flying some of their foreign planes. Reports of Russian airlines’ cannibalization of foreign aircraft similarly underscore a dire situation.

Less well known is how sanctions hurt Russian manufacturing since Western technology is critical to aircraft such as the Sukhoi Superjet 100, which uses a French-Russian engine (though Russians are working on a substitution). Production of the Yakovlev design bureau’s MC-21 passenger airplane faces significant delays due to sanctions that force substitution of its Western-made parts. Sanctions even helped push Russia out of a joint venture with China to produce the CR929 widebody aircraft. While China is happy to help Russia thwart sanctions, this plane needs Western systems that sanctions complicate.

In response, Russia has adapted to and thwarted some aviation sanctions, which I predicted would happen because Putin’s regime is reproducing a state-centered aviation sector rooted in the Soviet past. The war has accelerated the state’s growing control over this vital economic sector, which began before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Examples include the state’s 51% ownership of Aeroflot since 1994, the merger of two smaller, state-run airlines in 2003 and the consolidation of aircraft manufacturing in the state-owned United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), which was created in 2006. More recently, the Russian state has helped the country’s airlines weather sanctions by facilitating the illegal confiscation of foreign aircraft. Russian airlines have also proven resourceful by purchasing spare parts through brokers in the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. Better known for supplying Russia with drones, Iran also agreed to provide Russian airlines with spare parts and has been fixing an Aeroflot Airbus for months. Many foreign airlines continue to fly to Russia, and Putin’s regime rewards friendly countries with overflight rights.

 But the longer sanctions remain, the harder it’s getting for Russia. To regain profitable foreign routes, its airlines are receiving government assistance to legitimately purchase the Western aircraft they illegally seized, although recent holdups in allocating such funds are causing doubts. In a throwback to the Soviet era, Putin’s regime boasts that Russia doesn’t need the West’s airplanes anyway since its one manufacturer, the UAC, will pick up the slack. Such import substitution is unlikely to succeed, as multiple delays suggest. More likely, Russia’s aviation sector will grow more reliant on the state, if not actually part of it like the UAC. This will make Russian aviation less efficient, less innovative and more expensive. Iranian airlines, which have long suffered under foreign sanctions despite some success circumventing them, present their Russian counterparts with a grim vision of the future such as being shut out of lucrative air travel markets and falling behind in emerging aviation technology.

How does this shape safety in Russia’s skies? The short answer is that it’s not as bad as headlines suggest and the impact of sanctions is ambiguous at best. Click bait stories paint a dire picture but often conflate commercial, military and general aviation into alarming numbers that do not accurately capture what ordinary passengers face. Some accounts, such as one claiming 120 accidents occurred in 2023, provide few details or sources. Annual safety reports from Russia’s Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) allow for comparison over time but often obscure Russia’s situation by combining data from each post-Soviet state it monitors. Its 2019 report is mysteriously missing and its decision not to investigate the fatal crash of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Embraer Legacy 600 plane suggests meddling from above.

That said, the IAC source base is the most systematic we have. Keeping in mind the potential for the politicization of its conclusions, what does a critical reading of its data alongside other sources suggest? First, fatal crashes in commercial and general aviation actually decreased in Russia from 18 in 2021 to 13 in 2022, and related deaths decreased from 70 to 24. Data for the first half of 2023 points in the same direction, with six fatal crashes and nine deaths. This trend was likely helped by the 14% decline in traffic after February 2022. While so many fatal crashes sound substantial, all but three in 2021 and all but one in 2022 involved small aircraft under 5,700 kilograms, not the jetliners we associate with most commercial flying.

Absolute figures on crashes and deaths capture headlines but they don’t say much about safety without considering their relation to passengers flown or departures. According to the IAC, the rate of aviation accidents and the rate of fatal crashes per one million departures both increased from 2020 to 2021 but then decreased in 2022. The IAC does not single out Russia from other post-Soviet states for this metric. But since Russia has the largest aviation sector among those countries, these data suggest that its aviation safety has not dramatically worsened since early 2022. Indeed, even critics who argue that Russian airlines are less safe partly because of sanctions conclude that “2022 and 2023 were also good years for airline safety [in Russia] compared to 2021.”

Comparisons with the U.S. similarly suggest that passenger aviation is not as disastrous as some headlines suggest. The IAC data indicates that Russia and other post-Soviet states are usually but not always behind the U.S. in passenger aviation safety. In 2018, for example, IAC countries reported a 0.8 rate of fatal crashes per 1 million departures of passenger aircraft above 5,700 kilograms. Comparable statistics from the National Transportation Safety Board showed a 0.11 rate for that year for scheduled U.S. carrier flights. In 2019, the rates were 2.3 (IAC) and 0.10 (U.S.), but in 2020, both IAC countries and the U.S. enjoyed a 0.0 rate of fatal crashes. The following year, however, IAC countries reported a 1.9 rate of fatal crashes, whereas the NTSB reported a 0.0 rate.1

Against this background of Russian airline safety, let’s now turn to the impact of sanctions. While some commentators emphasize that no fatal crashes have been tied to sanctions, others claim they make Russian airlines unsafe and that it’s only a matter of time before such a fatal crash happens. Some even argue that life-threatening dangers prove aviation sanctions are effective and could help turn Russians against Putin.

To reassure the public, Russian aviation officials insist the country’s airlines are safe despite sanctions, as do Russian business media and aviation journalists. This plays to Putin’s claims to legitimacy based in part on withstanding anything the West throws at him. In sharp contrast, Ukrainian media tells Russians their airlines are a disaster waiting to happen precisely because of sanctions. Independent Russian journalists banished by Putin concur, raising alarms about efforts to cover up the impact of sanctions and about the many ways Russian airlines cut corners on safety. In short, an information war exists around the morbid question of whether a Russian jetliner will crash and the role sanctions could play.

Fears of a fatal crash were validated by the emergency landing of a Ural Airlines A320 in September, apparently caused by malfunctioning hydraulics tied to sanctions. But a closer examination by a Russian aviation journalist suggests the pilots played a more important role by pressing on to an airport for which there wasn’t enough fuel. Recent Russian state assessments of aviation safety similarly point to pilot error and poor training as the chief causes of aviation incidents. More generally, airplane disasters are usually caused by a convergence of factors—bad weather, a manageable mechanical failure and pilot error—not just one problem. In public discussions, however, pinpointing sanctions’ role tracks more with the politics of the war than technical expertise.

At the end of the day, Russian airlines and aviation authorities are solely responsible for putting planes in the sky and Russians’ lives at risk. They continue to claim that everything is fine. But if a fatal crash of a Boeing or Airbus flown by a Russian airline kills hundreds, I predict this narrative will quickly change. Putin will blame the West as he does for everything else affecting his legitimacy, from Russia’s economic problems and his diplomatic failures to protests against his regime and even the war he started in Ukraine.

Such a scenario will be a serious test for policymakers who argue that punishing Russia with sanctions is still worth it. To prepare for this, they need to take a page from the Biden administration’s release of intelligence on Russia’s military buildup before the full-scale invasion: publicize as much intelligence as possible on sanctions and their impact, as well as Russia’s aviation sector and what it does or doesn’t do to ensure safety. As Putin’s regime falls back on Soviet-era secrecy about airline safety, sharing such intelligence will be a powerful tool. This will also contribute to broader Western efforts at combatting Russia’s better known disinformation campaigns such as those denying its human rights abuses in Ukraine.


Covering Russia? UMW's experts are featured in the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

expert-perspective-umws-steven-e-harris-lends-his-opinion-to-the-russia-file

  The following piece was written by Steven E. Harris  published  by the Wilson Center in April 2024

Sanctions Are Spoiling Russia’s Plans to Make Its Own Airplanes  Putin’s regime is feeling confident these days. Advances on the battlefield in Ukraine, expansions in armaments production, and the dithering of Republicans in the U.S. Congress show the war has turned in Russia’s favor. A well-orchestrated presidential election and some real public support buoy the regime. Political opponents are either dead, in prison, or in exile.

Putin’s regime has also declared victory in blunting Western sanctions and now plans to permanently thwart them with programs of import substitution. Nowhere is this better seen than in aviation, where the state proclaims it will produce over a thousand new airplanes to replace the foreign aircraft its airlines have long flown.

But this bold vision for aviation autarky has little chance of succeeding.

Russia’s Short-Term Success in Blunting Aviation Sanctions Thus far, Putin’s regime has weathered aviation sanctions through a two-pronged strategy. First, Russian airlines illegally kept about 400 foreign airplanes—primarily Airbuses and Boeings—owned by foreign leasing companies. Second, the state bankrolled settlement claims in order to purchase some of these airplanes so that airlines could fly them abroad without risk of repossession and reduce their foreign debt. To date, approximately 170 foreign airplanes have been legally acquired in this fashion, and the Ministry of Transportation recently asked for more cash to continue settling claims on the remaining 230 foreign planes.

The next question is how long Russian airlines, from the state-owned flag carrier Aeroflot to private companies such as S7 and Ural Air Lines, can continue flying their foreign planes. As I wrote in late October, safety has been degraded far less than predicted. But in the absence of spare parts, software updates, and thorough maintenance by foreign providers, Russian airlines have about two years before they will have to ground Boeings and Airbuses for major repairs performed using third-party spare parts.

Anticipating the eventual retirement of foreign planes, Putin’s regime has embarked on a massive program to make all-Russian airplanes. This program promises independence from Western technology and leasing companies but reveals the success of sanctions and fundamental weaknesses in state capacity.

 The 2030 Aviation Manufacturing Plan Announced in June 2022, the program calls for the state-owned industrial conglomerate Rostec to manufacture 1,036 airplanes with only Russian parts by 2030. In January 2024, the state allocated 283 billion rubles (U.S. $3.1 billion) to help finance the production of 609 airplanes and prioritize medium-haul aircraft in the overall manufacturing plan.

Before sanctions, Russian manufacturers produced a small number of narrow body, medium-haul airplanes such as the MC-21 and the Superjet-100 (SSJ-100) with Western components. Twelve SSJ-100s were manufactured in 2021 and ten the following year.

Among the aircraft slated to replace Boeings and Airbuses, the plan called for production in 2023 of three medium-haul Tupolev-214 (Tu-214) airplanes and two Superjet-NEW planes (Superjet-100s with all-Russian parts). None of these were built. In fact, the state-owned United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) failed to manufacture a single passenger airplane in 2023.

More recently, the UAC conceded further delays of up to two years for rollout of the MC-21, SSJ-NEW, and Tu-214, as well as of smaller, short-haul aircraft such as the Ilyushin-114 (Il-114) and the “Baikal.”

The transition to total import substitution is proving difficult, making it impossible to fulfill early targets of the manufacturing plan. By withdrawing access to Western technology critical for manufacturing, sanctions have successfully shut down production. Russian manufacturers will produce at best inferior aircraft that fly shorter routes using more fuel. 

At its current rate, the UAC is unlikely to manufacture more than a dozen or so showcase narrow body airplanes before 2030. The manufacturer may have better luck producing simpler planes, such as the Baikal, but the state’s injection of 283 billion rubles doesn’t target its production or that of two other short-haul airplanes.

Since the UAC will likely not meet the plan’s annual targets any time soon, Russia’s airlines will have to make do with their aging foreign airplanes and acquire spare parts from third parties. Putin admitted as much at his call-in event in December 2023, during which he praised the import-substitution plan but added that the government would continue to purchase illegally held foreign planes.

What Will Russia’s Aviation Manufacturing Plan Actually Produce? Rather than produce new aircraft, the immediate purpose of the state’s manufacturing plan is political theater. The infusion of 283 billion rubles was meant to show the public, before the presidential elections, that Putin’s regime is serious about securing commercial aviation and to generate a sense of normalcy in the midst of war.

In the long run, the manufacturing plan is more likely to produce further distortions in Russia’s political economy. These include corruption, secrecy, technologically backward aircraft, and even more state control over commercial aviation.

The 283 billion rubles will help Rostec keep state-run subsidiaries such as the United Engine Corporation operating with soft budget constraints and favorable contracts that now lack any competition from Western firms. Executives will siphon off their share of the funds, while Putin’s regime will turn a blind eye as long as everyone remains loyal.

If the manufacturing plan continues to falter, state-owned manufacturers will have more incentive to keep their failures secret. In 2023, for example, the Ural Civil Aviation Factory kept hidden cost overruns for the Baikal. When news of a 48 percent increase was finally publicized, Putin’s point man for the Far East region, Yuri Trutnev, was incensed and proclaimed, “Our people are like that: they don’t like to share information.”

For now, Putin’s regime allows the Russian business media to report fairly openly about the country’s aviation industry on issues such as spare parts and safety, state subsidies, and shortfalls in production. But if commercial flying becomes more precarious and the manufacturing plan remains unfulfilled, the government will likely limit what the public knows about its airlines and long-term plans to maintain them.

As the economic historian Mark Harrison shows in his recent book, Secret Leviathan, secrecy in the Soviet era significantly degraded state capacity in many areas, including production. Post-Soviet autocrats face a similar “secrecy/capacity tradeoff,” while newer techniques of disinformation further erode capacity. In attempting to revive the Soviet Union’s autarkic aviation industry, Putin’s regime will find it hard to avoid similar reductions in capacity. 

Insofar as Russia’s commercial aviation industry is concerned, the lesson for the West is that it pays to play the long game. Russia has effective tools for blunting sanctions in the short run, but in the long run it faces structural obstacles and the absence of Western technology, both of which will degrade this economic sector. The main question remains whether the United States and its allies can keep up the pressure by enforcing sanctions.




Expert Perspective: UMW's Steven E. Harris lends his opinion to The Russia File

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